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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Where a party has failed to comply with the rules of appellate procedure, including failure

to cite to the record, and providing only a two-page argument with inadequate case support and
analysis, should appellate review be denied as a sanction in addition to costs?
2.

Does the record support the trial court's findings of fact?

2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying an award of profits or losses based on

those findings?
a.

If a partner with the burden of accounting fails to come forth with a sufficient

accounting must a court accept an unreliable, inconsistent and unsupported estimate of
profits from the other partner?
b. If a "partnership" consists of "carrying on" and "winding up," can equity allow a
"partnership accounting" for either of these parts in isolation of the other?
c. If record supports a finding that no post-dissolution profits (if any) were derived
either without the consent of the other partner or from the use of partnership property,
must a court still award "profits" based on Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-18 (1953)?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for the equitable actions of partnership accounting is bifurcated.
Although Utah Constitution Article VIII, section 9 allows that, "in equity cases, the appeal may be
1

on questions of both law and fact;" the appellate courts rarely exercise this power. The findings of
a court of equity will only be overturned where "clearly erroneous." Dang v. Cox Corp.. 655 P.2d
658, 660 (Utah 1982); Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1981). And the judgments of a
court of equity will only be overturned only with a showing of abuse of discretion or no reasonable
supporting basis. Nupetco Associates v. Jenkins. 669 P.2d 877, 883-84 (Utah 1983). In partnership
accounting context the Nupetco Court held that "[t]he applicable standard of review is as follows:
While it is true that in equity cases this Court may review questions of both
law and fact we are not bound to substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court, and because of its advantaged position we give considerable deference
to its findings and judgment.
1^ at 883 (emphasis added) (quoting Ream v. Fitzen. 581 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1978) (citations
omitted) (also citing Dang v. Cox Corp.. 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 1982); Parks Enterprises. Inc. v. New
Century Realty. Inc.. 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982)). The Nupetco Court continued, "We recognize that
a trial court is granted broad discretion in selecting the appropriate manner for the sale of assets of
a dissolving partnership. Thus, we uphold the trial court's method of disposition in the present case
because it is reasonable." Id at 884 (emphasis added).1 The Hawaii Supreme Court, in accord with
Utah's Nupetco decision, similarly held that actions for partnership accounting are "addressed to the

1

See also Graham v. Street. 270 P.2d 456 (Utah 1954), which also concerned a partnership
accounting. Although the standard of review was not clearly delineated in the case, the Court found
it "properly within the discretion of the lower court to award interest . . . " (Id^ at 460) and quoted
language from 40 Am. Jur., Partnership, § 353 t h a t " . . . allowance or disallowance [of interest] is,
to a large extent, discretionary with the court, and depends largely on the circumstances of the
particular case." IdLat461.
2

sound discretion of the court." Block v. Lea. 688 P.2d 724, 733 (Hawaii App. 1984) (citing Am.
Jur. 2d Partnership § 266 (1972)).
By analogy the actions of a court in dissolution of a partnership cases are very similar to actions
in dissolution of marriage cases, especially when it comes to a division of assets between the parties.
Just like a married couple, partners hold property in common, and just like a married couple the
emotions are usually highly charged when making the division of property. "In making such orders,"
in the context of a marriage, explained the Utah Supreme Court, "the trial court is permitted broad
latitude, and its judgment is not lightly disturbed . . . ." Newmeyer v. Newmeyer. 745 P.2d 1276
(Utah 1987). The Utah Court of Appeals further held: "the trial court has considerable latitude in
adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitle to a presumption of validity."
Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted). The division of
marital assets will only be disturbed, continued the Naranjo Court "if there was a misunderstanding
or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial prejudicial error. . . . " Id, By analogy the same
reasoning should apply in the partnership accounting context.
Speaking generally of actions in equity, the Utah Supreme Court found it "well established that
because of the advantaged position of the trial court, we give considerable deference to his findings
and judgments."

Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976) (citations omitted).

Explaining the reason behind this deference the Jacobson Court explained that "[i]t is inherent in the
nature and purpose of equity that it will grant relief only when fairness and good conscience so
demand. Correlated to this is the precept that equity . . . reserves its rewards for those who are
3

themselves acting in fairness and good conscience, or as is sometimes said, to those who have come
into court with clean hands." IcL (citations omitted).
A court of equity only abuses its discretion if there exists "no reasonable basis for the decision."
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). Only if the trial judges ruling is "so
unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion" will
it be reversed. Judge Norman H. Jackson, "Utah Standards of Appellate Review," Vol 7. No. 8.
Utah Bar J. 9, 19-20 (citing Kunzler v. O'Dell. 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993);and Ames v.
Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah App. 1993)).
PERTINENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-17 (1953):
Duty of partners to render information. The partnership books shall be
kept, subject to any agreement between the partners, at the principal place
of business of the partnership, and every partner shall at all times have
access to and may inspect and copy any of them.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18 (1953), first paragraph:
Partner accountable as a fiduciary. Every partner must account to the
partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits, derived by
him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected
with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership or from any use
by him of its property.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-19 (1953):
Right to an account. Any partner shall have a right to a formal account as
to partnership affairs:
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership
business or possession of its property by his copartners.
4

(2) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement.
(3) As provided for by Section 48-1-18.
(4) Whenever other reasonable circumstances render it just
and reasonable.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-26 (1953):
"Dissolution" defined. The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the
relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the
carrying on, as distinguished from the winding up, of the business.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-27 (1953):
Partnership not terminated by dissolution. On dissolution a partnership
is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is
completed.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-30 (1953):
General effect of dissolution on authority of partner. Except so far as
may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to complete transactions
begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority of any
partner to act for the partnership.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-34 (1953):
Right to wind up. Unless otherwise agreed, the partners who have not
wrongfully dissolved the partnership . . . has the right to wind up the
partnership affairs . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37(1) and (2) (1994):
Rules for distribution. In settling accounts between the partners after
dissolution the following rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement
to the contrary:
(1) The assets of the partnership are:
(a) partnership property; and
(b) contribution of the partners specified in
Subsection (4).
5

(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in the order of
payment, as follows:
(a) those owing to creditors other than partners;
(b) those owing to partners other than for capital and
profits;
(c) those owing to partners in respect to capital; and
(d) those owing to partners in respect of profits.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature Of The Case And Course of Proceedings Below.
This action began with Mr. Phillips' request for a partnership accounting and for return of
certain personal property. (R.1-4). Mr. Hatfield counterclaimed for an accounting of the "winding
up" period, in which time Mr. Phillips completed jobs bid before dissolution. (R. 7-12) Mr. Hatfield
was in possession of all the records for the pre-dissolution or "carrying on" period of the partnership;
he failed to produce these records. (R. 226; Tr2 155). Mr. Phillips was in control of all the postdissolution or "winding up" period of the partnership; he too failed to produce sufficient records. (
R. 365).
The trial court's final (Amended) Order dated August 31, 1990 (R. 224-27) held in relevant

(7). The Court finds that the defendant [Mr. Hatfield] failed to establish the actual amounts
of profit and loss on the outstanding contracts which were performed by the plaintiff. The
Court is not willing to award a percentage of the bid price on all projects as proper because
there was some testimony that some of the projects were performed at a loss. Without exact
figures as to profit or loss on each of the projects, the Court will not make any division of the
proceeds from those projects.

6

(8). The Court makes no finding as to an accounting of the partnership because the records
required to make such an accounting are missing.
(R. 226) (emphasis added).
The trial court's decision was subsequently appealed by defendant and the Utah Court of
Appeals reversed the decision in part. The decision was reversed to correct the trial court's error in
placing the burden to account for post-dissolution profits or losses on the defendant, when the
plaintiff, Mr. Phillips, had control of the records for that period of the partnership. Specifically the
January 28, 1992 Order stated:
that the judgment is reversed to the extent that it does not allocate profit and loss resulting from
jobs bid prior to dissolution and performed after dissolution by plaintiff, Russell Phillips, and
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the case is remanded to the trial court for the purpose
of making the allocation described in the preceding paragraph and that the burden to account
for any profits realized from the jobs shall be placed upon plaintiff, Russell Phillips, as required
by Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-18 (1989).
(R. 264) (italics added). The Court of Appeals reversed as to finding (7) of the trial courts'
judgment but did not reverse as to finding (8). In other words this Court left undisturbed the trial
court's original finding that Mr. Hatfield's failure to produce records of the pre-dissolution or
"carrying on period" of the partnership made a "partnership accounting" impossible.
The case was remanded back to the trial court and on July 27, 1994 the court found as follows:
1. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence as to the profit
or loss of jobs bid prior to the dissolution as required by Section 48-1-18 of Utah Code
Annotated.
2. The Court finds that no accounting was able to be completed because of the lack of
the accounting records.

7

3. The Court further finds that the Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden ofproof because
it has not supplied the Court with enough facts to make a determination of the profit and loss.
4. The Court finds that because insufficient evidence has been produced to make an
accounting, the Court will not award either party profits or losses from these jobs.
5. The Court finds that with the exception of two "Baker scaffolding," there is
insufficient evidence to find that the Plaintiff did not receive the personal property previously
awarded to him. Other than this scaffolding, which the Defendant is ordered to deliver to the
plaintiff, the Plaintiff has received all that he has coming.
(R. 365) (emphasis added).
Hatfield appealed this decision to the Utah Supreme Court, and the case was subsequently
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. (Letter from Clerk of Utah Supreme Court dated Feb. 10,
1995).
B. Pertinent Facts From Second (Remand) Trial Transcript:
Mr. Hatfield produced insufficient evidence to support his estimates:
1.

At no place in the entire transcript does Mr. Hatfield establish how much he estimates

the profit to be on the post-dissolution jobs. Mr. Hatfield's attorney mentioned in his opening
statement that Mr. Hatfield believed there was a 20% margin of profits on each bid. (Transcript 2
["Tr2"] 8).
2.

Mr. Hatfield's counsel attempted to introduce an exhibit as an example of the kind of

profit margin built into P&H Plastering bids, a bid from 1984 showing an alleged 25 percent for
overhead and profit, but the trial court did not allow the exhibit on an objection that it was immaterial
and irrelevant. (Tr2 141).

8

3.

The 1984 Tax Returns for P & H plastering showed no such profits as the proffered bid

would suggest. (Tr2 141).
4.

P & H Plastering consistently operated at a loss. (Trl 46-47).

5.

Mr. Hatfield testified that 25 percent "was customary" and that the price usually bid was

at "minimum would be 25 percent. I bid right now-I bid fire protection for much more than that.
But minimum would be 25 percent." (Tr2 140).
6.

Mr. Hatfield admitted that at the original district court trial his counsel submitted an

exhibit estimating a 5 percent profit on jobs; he states that his prior counsel, Mr. Petro, prepared the
exhibit and that he [Mr.Hatfield] now does not believe the figures are accurate. (Tr2. 137 and 15859).
7.

Mr. Hatfield's own witness, accountant Randy E. Dunn testified that just because there

was a built in 5 percent profit margin in a job did not necessarily mean that one would receive that
much profit. (Tr2. 90).
8.

Mr. Dunn further testified that difficulties such as the ones testified to by Mr. Phillips

(problems with the architect in interpreting drawings, misreading of drawings causing a mistake in
bid calculation, etc.) would alter whether profit would or would not be made on these jobs. (Tr2 91).
9.

Mr. Dunn testified that wages paid to one partner, if allowed under the agreement, would

further diminish the "profit" made on jobs. (Tr2. 98).
10.

Mr. Dunn testified to his belief that the only accurate way do an accounting of these

matters would be to keep track of receipts and expenditures of each job individually. (Tr2. 97).
9

11.

Mr. Dunn further testified that Mr. Hatfield himself did not keep track of each job

individually before the partnership was dissolved, and that Mr. Hatfield also erred by putting all the
receivables for his three separate businesses in one account. (Tr2. 97).
12.

When asked whether most people have the records he would have liked to have seen from

Mr. Phillips (nine years after the fact), Mr. Dunn testified that one must only keep business records
for three years, although he added that most will keep them from five to ten. (Tr2. 100-01).
Mr. Hatfield was the managing partner during the pre-dissolution or "carrying on" of
partnership; Mr. Phillips was always the laboring partner:
13.

Mr. Hatfield stated at trial: "I was president of the Company. . . . I more or less

supervised the bidding process, the accounting, going through the company. Mainly I was providing
the financing for the company." (Tr2. 131).
14. Mr. Hatfield put all receivables from three separate companies into one single account.
(Tr2 131).
15. Mr. Hatfield had the responsibility of keeping track of "payables" and "deposits." (Tr2
132-33).
16. Mr. Phillips performed all of the plastering for the partnership; Mr. Hatfield lacked the
necessary expertise. (Tr2 146).
Mr. Hatfield failed to produce the records for the pre-dissolution period necessary to
complete a partnership accounting:
17. Mr. Hatfield could not recall delivering the box of partnership records to the court
appointed accountant. (Tr2 154).
10

18. Deposition testimony was read into the record from Mark Mueller, court-appointed
accountant, that despite Mr. Hatfield's promises the box of partnership records was never delivered
to him and that it was impossible for him to complete an accounting without these records. (Tr2 155).
19. Then Mr. Hatfield changed his testimony saying that "I would have done that [deliver the
records] . . . We must have. We did." (Tr2. 156).
Mr. Hatfield consented to Mr. Phillips Completing The Transactions During Winding Up;
Profits Were Not Derived From Transactions Without Hatfield's Consent
20. Mr. Hatfield testified that on advice of counsel both he and Mr. Phillips agreed to "go
finish the projects together, keep records of the accounting and then split the profits or losses for the
jobs." (Tr2. 145).
21. Mr. Hatfield attempted to do one job (the "Hill Field Job") but was unable to complete it
due to lack of experience, and did not hire an experienced plasterer to assist him. (Tr2. 146).
22. Mr. Hatfield consented to Mr. Phillips completing the jobs. (Tr2 146; Trl 99).
23. Despite their agreement Mr. Hatfield did not assist in any of the jobs, and although he was
permitted to monitor the accounting he did not do so. (Tr2. 145, and transcript in entirety).
24. Mr. Phillips performed some of the jobs because he (the partnership) was threatened with
breach of contract litigation. (Trl 100).
Partnership Tools Were Not Used In Completing Jobs Bid Before But Completed After
Dissolution.
24. Mr. Hatfield testified that he removed the scaffolding he had put up for the Hill Field Job.
(Tr2 146).
11

25. Mr. Phillips removed some tools and equipment from P & H Plastering premises but these
were subsequently and secretly repossessed from his pickup truck by an agent of Mr. Hatfield. (Trl
43)
26. The tools were ordered to be returned to Mr. Phillips at the conclusion of the first trial,
and some were still not returned as of the time of the remand trial. (Tr2. 27).
27. At no time during the original trial or the trial on remand did Mr. Hatfield allege or
establish that profits were derived from use of partnership property. (Trl & 2 in their entirety).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should refuse to consider Mr. Hatfield's appeal on the basis that it was inadequately
briefed. Mr. Hatfield has not complied with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. He has failed
to give any citations to the record, has cited only two cases remote in time and jurisdiction, has not
provided any meaningful analysis of the issue, and has not sufficiently researched the standard of
review. This Court should, as a sanction, deny appellate review and order costs.
If the Court determines to address the merits of this case, the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed. First the trial court's findings of fact should be upheld since Mr. Hatfield failed to
marshal the evidence and since they are supported by the record. Second, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by equitably determining that neither party should be awarded profits or losses,
based on the undisputed findings of fact. Even if the issue framed by Hatfield were answered in the
affirmative, it does not follow that the court erred in leaving the parties where the court found them.
At least three reasonable bases support the trial court's judgment: (1) Even though Phillips failed to
12

meet his burden, the court had authority to refuse to accept Hatfield's "estimate" because he failed
to present any reliable evidence or even any specific estimate of what "profits" he should be awarded.
(2) Even if the court had arrived at an amount of "profits" from the post-dissolution jobs, equity
would not allow an award based on that finding alone. Phillips did not meet his burden of accounting
for the post-dissolution or "winding up" period; however, Hatfield did not meet his burden for the
pre-dissolution or "carrying on" period of the partnership. Not only is a "partnership accounting"
rendered physically impossible without records and figures from both the "carrying on" period of the
partnership and the "winding up" period, but also a court in equity may refuse to grant relief to a
party in pari delicto. (3) Since the record supports a finding that no post-dissolution "profits" (if any)
were derived "without the consent of" the other partner and that no profits were derived from the "use
of partnership property," Hatfield is not entitled to any profits based on Utah Code Annotated § 48-118.
ARGUMENT
I. Appellate Review Should Be Denied Since Mr. Hatfield's Argument Was Inadequately
Briefed In Contravention To Rule 24 Of The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Appellate review should be denied in this case because Mr. Hatfield has failed to adequately
brief the issues and has otherwise violated Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("Ut.
R. App. P.").
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A. Mr. Hatfield's Violation Of Rule 24(a)(7) Should Preclude Appellate Review.
Rule 24(a)(7), Ut. R. App. P., states: "All statements of fact and references to the proceedings
below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) below."
Paragraph (e) establishes that reference must be made to the record or transcript page. Mr. Hatfield
has not made any citations to the record in his statement of the case, statement of the facts, nor in
his entire brief. In West Valley City . Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 n. 1 (Utah App.
1991), the Utah Court of Appeals, in its discretion, declined to dismiss an appeal solely on the basis
of Rule 24(a)(7). However, the Court stressed that "it is our prerogative to affirm the lower court
decision solely on the basis of failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Id.
(citing Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989); Demetropoulous v.
Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 961 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988)). The Majestic
Court further emphasized that there is no "substitute for the development of appellate arguments
explicitly tied to the record before us." IdL In its discretion this Court should deny review of
Hatfield's Appeal and affirm the trial court's decision on this basis alone.
B. Mr. Hatfield's Violation Of Rule 24(a)(9) Should Preclude Appellate Review
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9) sets forth additional requirements for the
argument portion of an appellate brief: "The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on." Mr. Hatfield's argument, in its entirety, spans two pages. As mentioned
the argument contains not one citations to the record nor does it refer to any relevant statutory
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authority. The only support given for Mr. Hatfield's position consists of two cases remote in time
and jurisdiction: a Pennsylvania case from 1933 and a Kentucky case from 1942 (quotes from both
being taken in block with no pinpoint cites to the actual cases). The argument is devoid of any
meaningful analysis of these cases or of the supporting Utah statutes.
Hatfield's brief is quite similar to the appellant's brief in Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 71
(Utah App. 1991), which the Utah Court of Appeals described as containing "less than a single page
of assertions . . . and no citations to the record, no legal authorities and no analysis whatsoever."
The Munns Court found the appellant's brief inadequate and since it was not in compliance with Rule
24(a)(9) and the Court "declined to address the issue." IcL at 72. Again, this Court could deny
review of Mr. Hatfield's appeal solely on this basis.
C. Mr. Hatfield's Failure To Comply With Rule 24(a)(5) Should Preclude Review
Mr. Hatfield also failed to research the applicable standard of review and incorrectly
represented that standard to the Court. Additionally, by couching his issue as purely one of law, Mr
Hatfield avoided all marshaling of the evidence. The Munns Court censured the appellant for similar
violations. Specifically in regard to the standard of review requirement the Court explained:
This standard of review requirement was added to our rules effective
April 1, 1990, and should not be ignored. The purposes of this requirement
is to focus the briefs, thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency in the
processing of appeals. Due to appellant's lack of compliance with our rules
on this issue, we assume the correctness of the trial court's judgment.
IcL at 73. This is yet another basis on which this court could affirm the trial court and deny appellate
review to Mr. Hatfield.
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These violations are not mere technicalities,2 but have significantly increased Mr. Phillips task
in preparing this brief. In addition to the extensive research Mr. Phillips was obliged to perform on
the issue raised but not fully briefed by Mr. Hatfield, he has had to start from scratch in marshaling
the evidence and researching the appropriate standard of review

Mr. Phillips has been forced not

only to defend himself from Hatfield's Appeal, but in order to argue a proper defense he first had to
assemble all the caselaw Hatfield neglected to find and construct all the arguments that Hatfield
should have made. Clearly "appellants rather than appellees bear the greater burden on appeal."
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Whse.. Inc.. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994). Mr.
Hatfield has not met this burden, and his appeal should be denied review.
D. Hatfield's Brief Is Insufficient To Support A Ruling From Appellate Court
Finally, and even more important than the extra work that Mr. Hatfield's brief has caused Mr.
Phillips, the brief provides no basis upon which this Court can rule. As recently stated by the Utah
Supreme Court, although in another context, "An appellant has the burden of at least initiating the
steps necessary to allow an appellate court to rule on appellant's claims." City of Murray v.
Robinson. 242 Utah Adv. Rep 53, 54 (Utah 1994). Mr. Hatfield has not taken these steps.
Hatfield's brief is comparable to the appellant brief at issue in State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599
(Utah App. 1992). In that case, appellants violated Rule 24(a)(9) by not adequately briefing their
argument. Because the brief did not properly address the standard of review for each issue, and
2

An example of a more "technical" violation of Rule 24 is the fact that Mr. Hatfield's brief refers
to the parties only as "appellant" and "appellee" in contravention of Rule 24(d) which requires, in the
interest of clarity, that these references be kept to a minimum.
16

because it contained no "meaningful" authority or analysis, the Yates Court concluded: "It is
impossible for us to discern what Donavan and Gerard Yates allege as error, what prejudice or harm
they claim to have suffered, and what remedy they seek from this court." "Accordingly," the Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id

Mr. Hatfield's brief suffers from the same three

deficiencies as the brief in Yates:
1. It is impossible to discern what Mr. Hatfield alleged as error.
Hatfield has claimed it was "error" for the court not to award him profits, but he has not
shown how this is error. As appellant, he has the burden of showing the trial court "erred." Turner
v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021, 1025 (Utah 1994). "To meet this burden," stated the Turner Court, he
"must provide this court with a complete record of all evidence relevant to alleged error. Utah R.
App. P. 11(e)(2). In the absence of a complete record 'we assume that the proceedings at trial were
regular and proper.'" Id* at . (citations omitted).
Even if the Court of Appeals were to answer his "issue" on appeal in the affirmative, Mr.
Hatfield has not demonstrated that this would preclude the trial court's judgment. Even if "all doubts
were resolved against" Mr. Phillips, in Mr. Hatfield's favor, the court could have ordered no profits
to either party, if for no other reason than that equity dictated the result (Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557
P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976)) or that Mr. Hatfield's testimony was not credible. (Homer v. Smith. 229
Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 (Utah App. 1993)). (See infra Argument II. A).
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2. Mr. Hatfield has not set forth what prejudice or harm he has suffered.
At no point in his brief has Mr. Hatfield made any claim of harm or prejudice. Indeed, Mr.
Hatfield could not claim harm or prejudice absent a showing that the entire partnership accounting
and division of pre- and post-dissolution assets was inequitable. He has not so argued in his brief.
3. It is unclear what remedy Hatfield seeks from this Court.
In his conclusion Mr. Hatfield "respectfully requests that this Court remand this case to the
District Court to enter judgment against the Appellee in favor of the Appellant consistent with the
Appellant's testimony regarding the profits that would have been earned from the relevant jobs."
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6). However, the trial court specifically found Mr. Hatfield's trial testimony
an insufficient basis upon which to award post-dissolution profits or losses. (R. 365). Furthermore,
the trial transcript reveals that at no point at trial did Mr. Hatfield provide the court with a specific
estimate of how much profits he should receive. There was talk of 5 percent, 20 percent, and 25
percent of bid prices, but this testimony was inconsistent and self-serving.
E. Based on Precedent And Discretion This Court Should Affirm The Trial Court's
Ruling, Refuse Appellate Review And Award Double Costs.
Based solely on the individual violations of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this
Court should affirm the trial court's judgment and deny review of Mr. Hatfield's inadequately briefed
appeal. Moreover, due to its inadequacies, the brief does not provide a sufficient basis upon which
this Court can rule. Having not met his burden on appeal, Mr. Hatfield has forced Mr. Phillips to
expend a large amount of time and money in order to perform all the original research in addition
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to preparing a defense. For these reasons, Mr. Phillips should also be entitled to double costs
pursuant to Utah R. App. 33(a).
Alternatively, in the event that this Court reviews the case on the merits and if Mr. Hatfield
gives additional support for his arguments, Mr. Phillips should be granted leave to respond to the
"corrected" or "bolstered" arguments.
II. Because The Record Supports Trial Court's Factual Findings And Since Hatfield
Did Not Marshal Evidence, This Court Should Accept Findings As True.
The trial court's factual findings must not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.

One

challenging the findings must show that they are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear
weight of the evidence,' thus making them clearly erroneous." In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885,
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). The transcript for the
remand hearing fully supports the court's findings of fact. The two facts most pertinent to this appeal
are: (1) that neither Phillips nor Hatfield presented competent evidence that supported an award of
profits or losses; and (2) that the lack of accounting records (from both pre- and post-dissolution
periods) precluded a partnership accounting.
A. Fact 1: Neither Phillips Nor Hatfield Presented Competent Evidence That
Supported An Award For Profits And Losses.
For purposes of argument Mr. Phillips will assume that the trial court was correct in finding
that the evidence he presented for post-dissolution profits and losses was insufficient. The question
is, did Mr. Hatfield produce sufficient evidence to support his estimate of profits and losses? The
transcript is indeed bereft of any competent evidence to support Mr. Hatfield's estimate of "profits"
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from the post-dissolution jobs performed by Mr. Phillips. Admittedly it is difficult for Mr. Hatfield
to estimate since he neither had personal knowledge of the jobs nor was he provided with sufficient
evidence from Mr. Phillips, who had the burden to make an accounting for those jobs. Nevertheless,
even if 'every doubt was resolved in Hatfield's favor' he himself raised nothing but doubt with his
in inconsistent and unreliable testimony; and testimony from Mr. Phillips and Mr. Hatfield's own
accountant cast further doubt on his "estimates."
Perhaps the most difficult problem in "presuming" Hatfield's profit estimates as true is the fact
that Mr. Hatfield never established a specific estimate during the entire trial on remand. During his
opening statement, counsel for Mr. Hatfield mentioned the figure of 20% of prices bid. (Tr2 8).
During trial Hatfield offered as an example of a P&H Plastering bids, an actual bid that allowed for
25% overhead and profits, but this was not admitted because of irrelevance and immateriality. (Tr2
141) Mr. Hatfield testified that he "now" puts in at the very least a 25% profit margins to his bids
and that this is "customary practice." (Tr2 140). But never at any time did Mr. Hatfield establish
what his estimate was. In fact, he admitted that he (through his counsel) had asked the court, during
the first trial, for an estimated 5% of the bid price (Tr2 137; 158-59) yet offered no reasonable
explanation of why he now estimates more profit. (WL) Five percent, twenty percent, twenty-five
percent . . . how could the trial court presume Mr. Hatfield's estimate to be true if it was never
determined what his estimate was?3
3

Counsel for the parties submitted written closing arguments. Even in closing counsel for Mr.
Hatfield did not delineate his estimate. The only number quoted was $347,770.00 which was
Hatfield's estimate of the total amounts collected from the post-dissolution jobs. (R. at 326). He does
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Next the court encountered the problem of inconsistency in Hatfield's request for 5 percent at
the time of the original trial and his request for perhaps up to 12.5 percent (half of 25 percent) at the
time of remand. The deviation upwards was unsupported by any competent evidence, and was only
explained by Mr. Hatfield's testimony that the 5 percent request was an error of his prior counsel and
that he did not now believe the 5 percent figures were accurate. This makes any new estimate of Mr.
Hatfield's inherently unreliable.
Additionally, not only did Hatfield vary in his estimates of how much profit he typically built
into a bid, but the evidence also showed that these hopes had historically not been realized. The
partnership had always operated at a loss. (Trl. 46-47). There was no evidence from which the trial
court could have concluded that the partnership suddenly became profitable following dissolution.
Furthermore, Mr. Hatfield's estimate was contradicted by the testimony of Mr. Phillips and of
Mr. Dunn (Hatfield's accountant). Mr. Phillips testimony, while perhaps not sufficient to meet his
burden of accounting, can be used to show that some of the projects were performed at a loss.
Testimony relating to problems with the architect, a mistake in the bids, problems with winterizing,
was competent.

Mr. Hatfield's accountant testified that all of these would serve to reduce the

amount of profits made on the jobs. (Tr2. ). The evidence showed that these were not desirable jobs
that Mr. Phillips snatched up without Mr. Hatfield's knowledge. Rather the record demonstrates that

not state what percentage of this amount he is entitled to, nor does he make any allowance for
materials, costs, labor for services (allowed in the partnership by agreement) etc.
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Mr. Hatfield either could not or would not perform these jobs, and that Mr. Phillips was forced to
do each job or else suffer the consequences of an action for breach of contract. (Tr2. ).
Finally, even if Mr. Hatfield's testimony was uncontroverted the trial court was not
required to accept it. The trial judge is in the best position to judge the credibility of witness
testimony and any uncontroverted evidence may be rejected if not credible, particularly if it is the
self-serving testimony of a party. Homer v. Smith. 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 (Utah App 1993).
The trial transcript supports the trial court's finding that Mr. Hatfield failed to produce sufficient
credible evidence to award him profits or losses from the post dissolution jobs.
B. Fact 2: The Lack Of Accounting Records From Both The Pre And Post
Dissolution Stages Of The Partnership Precluded An Accounting.
Again, for purposes of argument, Mr. Phillips accepts that he did not proffer enough evidence
to establish an accounting for the "winding up" period of the partnership. He did come forth with
tax reports and estimates from personal recollection, but nine years after the events he no longer
possessed the bank statements or invoices and cancelled checks desired by the opposing party.
Lacking more substantial records for the "winding up" period, the court was unable to establish either
profits and losses. And as mentioned above, without any competent or reliable estimate from Mr.
Hatfield, the court was given no information from which to base an award of profits and losses from
the "winding up" period.
Mr. Hatfield, on the other hand, was the managing partner of P&H Plastering and was in
possession of all of the records for the "carrying on" period of the partnership. Just as it was Mr.
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Phillips burden to produce an accounting for the "winding up" period, the burden was on Mr.
Hatfield to produce an accounting for the "carrying on" period. U.C.A. § 48-1-17 (1953). The trial
court found that the court lacked records for the "carrying on" period. (R. 365). The trial transcript
supports this factual finding. (See infra, Statement of Facts). Mr. Hatfield's deposition testimony was
introduced at trial as evidence that he did not keep adequate records as managing partner, stating:
"We never divided any profit. We had a hard time determining whether we made a profit or not
because of our bookkeeping." (quoted at Tr2. 151).
Mr. Hatfield gave inconsistent testimony at trial regarding the records he kept for the
partnership. He first testified that he did not remember promising to make copies of the predissolution records to deliver to the court appointed accountant, Mark Mueller. (Tr2. 154)
Mark Mueller's deposition was then read into the record as follows:
There was art occasion when the five of us met together to discuss the
accounting. It was brought to my office by Mr. Ronald Hatfield. During the
course of our conversation it was agreed Mr. Hatfield would take the
information which he had brought in and which was contained in a large box,
and make copies of same for Mr. Phillips to review. And after Mr. Phillips
would review the information, both he and Mr. Hatfield would again contact
me so I could review the information contained in the box and begin the
accounting process. The box was either taken by Mr. Hatfield or by Mr.
Petro, his attorney. I was never furnished the information which was
supposedly contained in the box so I could complete an accounting. I do not
have sufficient information to do an accounting of the books and records of
P&H Plastering.
(quoted at Tr2. 155). After the reading of Mr. Meuller's affidavit, Mr. Hatfield testified: "I would
have done that [deliver the records]. . . . We must have. We did." (Tr2. 156). The trial court
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found that the court lacked the records necessary to do an accounting and the aforementioned evidence
from the trial transcript clearly supports this finding.
C. Because Hatfield Did Not Marshal The Evidence This Court Must Take The
Court's Factual Assertions As True.
While counsel for Mr. Hatfield claims that the appeal is purely an issue of law, it is not. The
trial court's legal conclusions were inextricably connected to its finding of fact. In fact the trial
court's refusal to award either profits or losses is a direct result of its findings of fact that the court
lacked sufficient records to do so. (The court appointed accountant testified that "I do not have
sufficient information to do an accounting of the books and records of P&H Plastering." Id.) This
Court recently dealt with a similar situation in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage. 872 P.2d 1051
(Utah App. 1994). In that case Oneida attempted to characterize two issues as being questions of law
but this Court found that the trial court's disposition of the case "resulted from the trial court's
findings of fact and not from its application, interpretation or choice of law. Thus despite Oneida's
characterization, all the issues presented on appeal dispute the trial court's findings of fact." IcL at
1052.
In asking for an accounting in his favor, Mr. Hatfield is inherently disputing the court's finding
that a lack of records made the accounting physically impossible. By necessity he also must dispute
the fact that he did not provide sufficient evidence to support his estimate of profits, unless he is
arguing that any time a partner fails to meet his burden a court must accept even the most unreliable
estimate the other partner proffers.
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Thus, while implicitly challenging the trial court's findings of fact, Mr. Hatfield has failed to
prove the findings clearly erroneous. To do so he must marshal the evidence. This Court in Oneida
clarified the need for marshaling the evidence:
To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must
play the devil's advocate. '[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly
discharge the [marshaling] duty . . . , the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'
Id, at 1053 (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)).
This Court in Oneida emphasized the reasons behind the marshaling requirement as promoting
"efficiency and fairness". The Oneida Court wished to avoid the very situation we have before the
Court today: because Mr. Hatfield has failed to meet his burden on appeal he has forced Mr. Phillips
to do the work for him.
Mr. Hatfield has not marshaled the evidence and Mr. Phillips has shown that the transcript
supports the trial court's findings of fact. This Court should accept as true that: (1) Mr. Hatfield did
not present sufficient evidence to award him either profits or losses from the post-dissolution jobs;
and (2) Mr. Hatfield's failure to provide the partnership books and information for the pre-dissolution
partnership and Mr. Phillip's failure to provide sufficient records and information for the postdissolution partnership, precluded a partnership accounting.
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m . Based On Its Factual Findings The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
In Maintaining The Status Quo By Refusing To Award Profits Or Losses To Either
Party.
If this Court accepts the trial court's findings of facts, this Court must also accept the court's
conclusion because it has several reasonable bases to support it. Crookston. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah
1993).
A. If A Partner Does Not Sufficiently Meet His Burden Of Accounting A Court
Need Not Accept An Unreliable And Unsupported Estimate From The Other
Partner.
Mr. Hatfield argues that "if a partner fails to produce an accounting, every presumption should
be made against him." (Brief of Appellant p. 4) (quoting Bracht v. Connell. 160 A. 297 [no pinpoint]
(Pa. 1933) and Moore v. Moore. 166 S.W.2d 52 [no pinpoint] (Ky. 1942)). Mr. Hatfield reasons
that the only reason one would not produce a sufficient accounting is that he or she is attempting to
hide profits; after all, if there were losses the partners would want the others to be liable for them.
(Brief of Appellant p. 6)4. Mr. Hatfield's argument has several fatal flaws.
First the cases he cites, and others that support the position that 'every presumption will be
made against the partner who fails to meet his burden of accounting,' have prerequisites that must
be met before the position is invoked. Not only will the position only be invoked against "managing
partners," a technical term defined by partnership law, but normally bad faith must be apparent as

4

It is interesting that Mr. Hatfield should argue this when he himself failed to produce an
accounting for the great duration of the partnership of which he maintained control of the records.
According to Mr. Hatfield's reasoning there must necessarily be profits he has hidden from Mr.
Phillips or else he too would have produced an accounting.
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well. See Cederlund v. Cederlund. 499 P.2d 14 (Wash. App. 1972); Hansen v. Hansen 297 P.2d
879 (Mont. 1956) (quoting Wilson v. Moline. 38 N.W.2d 201 (Minn). At the trial court Hatfield
established neither that Mr. Phillips was the "managing partner" nor was any bad faith established
whatsoever. (Tr2. in its entirety).
Second, since neither Utah common law nor Utah statutory law has accepted the position that
'every doubt will be made against the partner who fails to meet his burden of accounting,' it could
not have been error for the trial court not to adopt this position. A related position that is established
in Utah common law and codified by statute is that partners have a fiduciary duty to one another,
must deal in good faith and not purposefully conceal information from each other. Nelson v. Matsch.
110 P. 856, 868 (Utah 1910); Burke v. Farrell. 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982) (citing U.C.A.
§48-1-18 (1953)). However, there is no evidence from the trial transcript that the parties dealt in
concealment or bad faith. What the parties both did is keep very poor records. Unfortunately such
is not uncommon in partnership accounting cases. See Sequin v. Boyd. 654 P.2d 808, 810 (Ariz.
App. 1982); Roesch v. Wachter. 618 P.2d 448 (Wash. App. 1980).
Third, and most importantly, even if every doubt were resolved against Mr. Phillips, as Mr.
Hatfield desires, this court was still justified in disbelieving Hatfield's testimony and was justified in
refusing to base an award on vague, contradicted, and self-serving estimates. As mentioned earlier,
a trial court does not have to accept even uncontroverted testimony that is not credible, especially
when it is self-serving testimony of a party. Homer v. Smith. 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44 (Utah App.
1993). (See supra Argument II. A.).
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Even if judgment were to be entered against Phillips in accordance with Mr. Hatfield's request,
"in favor of Appellant consistent with Appellant's testimony regarding the profits that would have
been earned from the relevant jobs." (Appellants Brief, p.6),

Hatfield's trial testimony was

insufficient to support an award. In a sense the court's final decision was a finding of zero profits
and zero losses. Although it did not make a "formal accounting," the trial court did divide up all
known assets and "attempted to strike a balance between the parties." See Seguin v. Boyd. 654 P.2d
808, 811 (Ariz. App. 1982). Mr. Hatfield has not demonstrated that this balance is clearly erroneous
nor that it is inequitable or prejudicial. He further cannot show as a matter of law that when a
partner does not meet his burden, that the court must accept any estimate for the other partner even
if such proffer is totally unreasonable, unreliable and unsupported.
B. Even If A Court Can Sufficiently Determine Profits Or Losses Of One Stage Of
A Partnership (For Either The "Carrying On" Stage Or The "Winding Up" Stage)
No Profits Or Losses May Be Awarded From Either Stage In Isolation; A
Partnership Accounting Balances Profits And Losses From Both Stages.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court was able to come up with a figure for profits, under
Utah law this amount, standing alone, could not be awarded to Mr. Hatfield. According to the Utah
Supreme Court, a partnership accounting must include a tallying and balancing of all profits and
losses for the duration of the partnership, while only additionally encompassing the winding up period
in certain situations.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-26 (1953) indicates that a partnership consists of the "carrying
on" of the business before dissolution, and the "winding up" period after dissolution. Section 48-1-27
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(1953) states: "On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of
affairs is completed." Nevertheless, subsequent to the enactment of these sections, the Utah Supreme
Court interpreted that a "partnership accounting" must include an accounting for the 'carrying on'
period of the partnership: "[n]ormally the accounting encompasses that interval between formation
of the partnership and the time when actual notice is brought home to the partner that the relationship
is to be dissolved." Graham v. Street. 270 P.2d 456, 459-60 (Utah 1954). The Court added that an
accounting would also encompass the winding up period //fraud is averred and there is continued use
of partnership assets during this period. IcL at 460 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the only profits
allowed by the Utah Supreme Court in Graham were those that resulted from the "use of partnership
assets "--in that case a partnership truck. IcL (Utah statutory law will additionally allow for profits
"derived without the consent of the other partners . . . "

U.C.A. § 48-1-18 (1953), but this was

evidently not at issue in Graham).
In order to complete a "partnership accounting" any profits gained or losses sustained during
the post-dissolution period must be balanced against any profits gained or losses sustained during the
pre-dissolution partnership. In this action for an accounting, the trial court could not order profits
based on the latter period without balancing the amount with the former and essential accounting
period (as defined by the Utah Supreme Court). Not only is it physically impossible to perform a
partnership accounting with figures from only the latter period of the partnership, but is inherently
inequitable for the court to force one partner to make an accounting for that part of the partnership
for which he is responsible, while excusing the other partner from that same fiduciary duty. And as
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the Utah Supreme Court has stated in the very context of a partnership accounting, "Equity will not
permit a party in a relationship of trust and confidence to profit from his own wrong." Graham. 270
P.2d at 459 (Utah 1954) (citations omitted).
This Court did not preclude such a finding by its Order of January 28, 1992 (R.264) remanding
the case back to the trial court. In addition to concluding that Mr. Hatfield bore the burden for the
post-dissolution period, the district court concluded in its initial judgment that: "The court makes no
finding as to an accounting of the partnership because the records required to make such an
accounting are missing." (R. 226). On Appeal this Court did not reverse as to the latter finding but
only "to the extent that" the court did not allocate profits and losses of the post-dissolution jobs
performed and to the extent that the burden was placed on Mr. Hatfield for this period over which
he did not have control. On remand the district court reaffirmed that: "no accounting was able to be
completed because of the lack of the accounting records." (R. 365). Because this was so held at the
original trial, implicitly sanctioned on appeal, and reaffirmed on remand, it remains a reasonable basis
on which the trial could rely in not awarding profits or losses to either party.
C. As An Alternative Basis For The Trial Court's Ruling, The Court Could
Have Denied Awarding "Profits" To Hatfield Because On Remand He Failed
To Establish The Statutory Requirements Of U.C.A. § 48-1-18.
The Utah Court of Appeals remanded this case back to the trial court "for the purpose of
making the allocation described in the preceding paragraph and that the burden to account for any
profits realized from the jobs shall be placed upon plaintiff, Russell Phillips, as required by Utah
Code Ann. § 48-1-18 (1989)[sicJ." (italics added). "As required by Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-18"
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suggests that if the requirements for the section are not met, then Mr. Phillips did not bear the
burden.
Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-18 (1953) states in relevant part:
Partner accountable as a fiduciary. Every partner must account to the
partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits, derived by
him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected
with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership or from any use
by him of its property.
(emphasis added). The record establishes the fact that any profits derived by Mr. Phillips during the
post-dissolution period were derived with either the implied or express consent of Mr. Hatfield. Mr.
Hatfield knew that Mr. Phillips was completing these jobs and did not object. Mr. Hatfield himself
had the opportunity to perform the jobs, he attempted to complete one, but he was unable to do so
and allowed Mr. Phillips to do so. Furthermore had Mr. Phillips not completed the jobs both parties
would have been liable, as partners, for damages as the result of several breached contracts. (See
Statement of Facts for transcript cites).

Surely this statute was meant to recover profits made on

secret dealings by a partner, not for completing projects with the consent of the other partner.
Although no Utah case could be found on this particular point, in a similar matter, and based on
nearly identical statutory provisions, the Hawaii Court of Appeals denied an accounting because,
"there is no evidence that he had received any profits without their consent." Block v. Lea. 688 P.2d
724, 733 (Hawaii App. 1984) (citing to Hawaii Revised Sections that are nearly identical to U.C. A.
48-1-17 and 18; also citing 60 Am.Jur.2d Partnership § 265, n.15 (1971)).
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The partner's interest in profits on jobs completed "with consent" is only that profit derived
from the "use of partnership property." See Graham and U.C.A. § 48-1-18 (1953). The record
establishes that although Phillips may have originally removed "partnership property" from P & H
Plastering, that these materials were subsequently .and secretly taken from his possession by Mr.
Hatfield. The transcript supports the fact that none of the jobs were completed with partnership
property. (See Statement of Facts). Nor at any time at trial did Mr. Hatfield aver that the jobs were
completed with partnership property. (Tr2. in its entirety). Therefore, Hatfield cannot recover profits
under either basis of U.C.A. § 48-1-18 (1953).
Admittedly this was not the actual basis for the trial court's judgment. Nevertheless this Court
is not limited to the actual reasons underlying the court's decision in order to find a supporting basis
for the decision. This principle of appellate review was expressed by the Utah Supreme Court in
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). The Court stated that "we
may affirm trial court decisions on any proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having assigned
another reason for the ruling." (citing e.g.. City Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co.. 683 P.2d 1053, 1060
(Utah 1984); In Re Estate of Hock. 655 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982); Rice. Melby Enter.. Inc. v.
Salt Lake County. 646 P.2d 696, 698 n. 3 (Utah 1982)).
Furthermore, while the trial court did not explicitly make the factual findings that 'no profits
were derived without the consent of Mr. Hatfield,' or that 'no jobs were completed with the use of
partnership assets,' the trial transcript does support both findings. The Supreme Court has held that
where evidence was admitted which might support the decision, but no specific finding was made,
32

it can be concluded "that the court implicitly" made the necessary finding. Olympus Hills Shopping
Center. Ltd. v. Landes. 174 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Nov 22, 1991).
Therefore, since no profits were acquired without the consent of Mr. Hatfield and no profits
were a result of the use of partnership property, U.C.A. § 48-1-18 did not "require" any profits from
the hand of Russell Phillips. This is an alternate reasonable basis for the trial court's decision to
award neither profits or losses to either party.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decree should be affirmed in all respects. First, because Mr. Hatfield has
failed to adequately brief his appeal, in violation of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, causing
Mr. Phillips to shoulder the burden on appeal and further providing an insufficient basis upon which
this Court could rule. Accordingly the appeal should be dismissed and double costs should be
awarded to Mr. Phillips.
Second, the decree should be affirmed because the factual findings were not clearly erroneous,
and the equitable findings were not an abuse of discretion. At least three reasonable bases support
the trial court's decision to award neither party profits or losses. One, is that Mr. Hatfield failed to
produce any competent evidence regarding his "estimate" of post-dissolution profits, notwithstanding
the fact that Mr. Phillips failed to meet his burden of accounting. The next basis is founded in
equity. It is physically impossible for a court in equity to perform a "partnership accounting" without
information from the pre-dissolution period of the partnership. It would also be an affront to equity
for the court to force one partner to account for alleged "profits" while excusing the other partner
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from his identical fiduciary duty. As a third basis for the decision, the trial court could have found,
based upon the evidence presented at the remand hearing, that no profits could be awarded to Mr.
Hatfield because none were derived without his consent, and none resulted from the use of partnership
property. U.C.A. § 48-1-18 (1953).
Ten years have passed since the onset of this litigation and Mr.Phillips implores this Court for
some finality. No accounting can be completed because the records are unavailable. This is the fault
of both parties as well as a result of the passage of time. A remand will produce nothing because
there is insufficient information on which to base an award.

Thus, having established three

reasonable bases to support the trial court's conclusions, Mr. Phillips asks this Court to uphold the
trial court's ruling as it ffis not an abuse of discretion, and bring an end to this eternal bickering.
DATED this /

day of March, 1995.

~+7f
DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

J:\lws\phillips.app
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